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Abstract
This paper shows that information eﬀects per se are not responsible for the Giﬀen
goods anomaly aﬀecting competitive traders’ demands in multi-asset, noisy rational
expectations equilibrium models. The role that information plays in traders’ strategies
also matters. In a market with risk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents have
a dual motive for trading: speculation and market making. While speculation entails
using prices to assess the eﬀect of private signal error terms, market making requires
employing them to disentangle noise traders’ eﬀects in traders’ aggregate orders. In a
correlated environment, this complicates a trader’s signal-extraction problem and may
generate upward-sloping demand curves. Assuming either (i) that competitive, risk
neutral market makers price the assets, or that (ii) the risk tolerance coeﬃcient of
uninformed traders grows without bound, removes the market making component from
informed traders’ demands, rendering them well behaved in prices.
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11 Introduction
In a well known paper, Admati (1985) showed that multi-asset, noisy rational expectations
equilibrium (NREE) markets display a number of anomalies. In particular, owing to cor-
relation eﬀects, traders’ demand functions could be upward-sloping in prices. This “Giﬀen
goods” anomaly was attributed to the contemporaneous workings of an information and a
substitution eﬀect generated by prices in an economy with asymmetric information. Indeed,
a price increase in a NREE could either signal an increase in the value of the asset pay-oﬀ
or be the eﬀect of a demand pressure from noise traders. For some parameter conﬁgurations,
traders could then interpret a price increase as good news about the asset’s fundamental
and increase their (long) position in the asset. Recently, Giﬀen goods anomalies have been
related to market behavior around “crashes” (see Gennotte and Leland (1990) and Barlevy
and Veronesi (2002)), to “market breakdowns” (see Battacharya and Spiegel (1991)) and to
unstable equilibria (see Cespa (2002)). Upward sloping demand curves make traders shy away
from assets whose price plummets and increase their long position in assets whose price rock-
ets, eventually amplifying market movements or preventing trade from happening at all in
equilibrium. 1 In this perspective, understanding the extent to which information eﬀects per
se determine such anomalies is therefore relevant.
This paper shows that information eﬀects alone are not responsible for Giﬀen goods anoma-
lies: the role that information plays in traders’ strategies also matters. Intuitively, privately
informed traders should be able to better disentangle noise from information and this should
lead them to choose their positions by comparing prices with their private signals. On the
contrary, traders that only observe (endogenous) public information (i.e. equilibrium prices)
should rely on correlation eﬀects in order to disentangle the informative content of a price
movement. Building on this insight, I show that in a market with risk-averse, uninformed
traders, informed agents have a dual motive for trading: speculation and market making.
They speculate on the diﬀerence between their private signals and equilibrium prices; they
accomodate traders’ total demand in each asset by comparing (common) prior information to
equilibrium prices. While speculation entails assessing the eﬀect of private signal biases, mar-
ket making requires disentangling noise traders’ eﬀects from fundamental information within
the observed aggregate orders. The latter complicates the signal extraction problem and
1In the Bhattacharya and Spiegel’s model, a market breakdown occurs whenever the “uninformed” agents
estimate that the insider’s informational trading motive overcomes his hedging motive. As a result, instead
of taking the other side of the order, they align their trades to those of the insider (and this, in the linear
equilibrium case, potentially generates the Giﬀen anomaly). However, owing to the lack of “noise” traders, no
one absorbs the aggregate order, and a breakdown ensues.
2(may) generate upward sloping demand curves. I therefore attribute Admati’s “Giﬀen” goods
anomaly to the market making component of informed traders’ demands.
Based on this intuition, I then give suﬃcient conditions under which the Giﬀen goods
phenomenon disappears from informed traders’ strategies. Intuitively, this occurs whenever
informed traders ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to accomodate liquidity shocks. Thus, either assuming
that competitive, risk neutral market makers price the assets or letting the risk tolerance
parameter of uninformed traders grow unboundedly, allows to remove the anomaly from the
demand of informed agents but not from that of uninformed agents.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I outline the model’s assumptions,
deﬁne notation and recall the equilibrium result of Admati (1985). I then show by means of
examples that the market making component of an informed trader’s demand is responsible
for the Giﬀen goods anomaly. In section 3 I introduce risk neutral competitive market makers
in the model and show that this removes the anomaly from informed demands. In section 4 I
generalize the model in two ways. First, I consider a market where informed and uninformed
traders interact. This allows to show that the result of section 3 can be obtained as a limit
result when uninformed traders’ risk tolerance grows unboundedly. Next, I show that the
result obtained in the current simpliﬁed version of Admati (1985) applies to the equilibrium
found in her paper as well.
2 The Model
In this section I consider a simpliﬁed version of the market studied by Admati (1985).
Two classes of agents exchange a vector of K risky assets with random liquidation value
v » N(¯ v;Π
¡1
v ) and a riskless one with unitary return: a continuum of risk-averse informed
traders distributed in the interval [0;1] and noise traders, trading for liquidity purposes.
Each informed agent i receives a K-dimensional vector of private signals si = v + ²i where
²i » N(0;Π
¡1
² ), and ²i, ²j are independent for i 6= j. Assume that his preferences are repre-
sented by a CARA utility U(¼i) = ¡expf¡¼i=°g where ° > 0 is the coeﬃcient of constant
absolute risk tolerance and ¼i = x0
i(v ¡p) is the proﬁt of buying x0
i = (xi1;xi2;:::;xiK) units
of each asset at price p. Normalize the informed traders’ initial wealth to zero and let noise
traders submit a K-dimensional vector of random demands u » N(0;Π
¡1
u ). Assume that the
random vectors v;u;²i are independent 8i and that the Strong Law of Large Numbers holds
(i.e.
R 1




u , and Π
¡1
² be positive deﬁnite
and suppose that the distributional assumptions are common knowledge among the agents in
3the economy. 2
2.1 The Equilibrium
Suppose that in the above market each trader submits a vector of demand functions indicat-
ing the position desired in each asset at every price, contingent on his private information.
Owing to market clearing, the resulting equilibrium price vector will then reﬂect all traders’
information. This, in turn, will provide each agent with an additional signal beyond the one
he privately observes, that he can exploit in forming his optimal demand. Therefore, in a
rational expectations equilibrium, prices perform two functions: they clear all markets and
they convey information to traders. In turn, traders’ beliefs are endogenous and their demand
functions are deﬁned only for equilibrium prices. 3
The following deﬁnition formally describes the rational expectations equilibrium concept
for the above market:
Deﬁnition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium for the above market is a price vector p
and demand functions fXi(si;p)gi2[0;1] such that (i) p is (v;u) measurable; (ii) Xi(si;p) 2
argmaxxi E[U(¼i)jsi;p]; (iii)
R 1
0 Xi(si;p)di +u = 0 almost surely.
The ﬁrst condition requires prices not to depend on single signals’ realizations. Indeed,
in the large market as each informed agent is small and private signals are independently
distributed, equilibrium prices should only vary either because of changes in the value of
the pay-oﬀ vector or because of noise traders’ demand realizations. The second condition
requires traders to choose optimal equilibrium demand functions given the equilibrium price
and their private information. Finally, the last condition requires the price vector to clear all
the markets.
To apply deﬁnition 1 to the current context, assume each informed trader i submits a
vector of demand functions Xi(si;p) and restrict attention to equilibria where the price is
a linear function of informed traders’ aggregate signals and noise traders’ demands. Owing
to CARA utility and the normality assumption, an informed agent’s equilibrium demand
is then linear in his private signal si and in the equilibrium price vector p. Indicate with
Xi(si;p) = Asi+Á(p) a candidate vector of equilibrium demand functions, where A and Á(p)
are respectively the matrix of trading aggressiveness and a linear function of the price to be
2It is worth stressing that informed agents receive i.i.d. private signals. This assumption allows to simplify
the equilibrium closed form solution with respect to Admati (1985), and is made without loss of generality,
since, as I will show in section 4.2, relaxing it does not change the results of the paper.
3For noisy rational expectations equilibrium models with a single risky asset see Hellwig (1980), Diamond
and Verrecchia (1981) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
4determined in equilibrium. The market clearing equation thus reads as
R 1
0 Asidi+Á(p)+u = 0,
and the following result holds:
Proposition 1 In the market outlined above there exists a unique linear equilibrium where
agents’ strategies and the equilibrium price vector are given by:





(¯ v ¡ p); (2.1)
p = Λz + (I ¡ ΛA) ¯ v;
where A = °Π², z = Av + u, Λ = (A + °Π)¡1(I + °AΠu), and Π = (Var[vjz])¡1 =
Πv + AΠuA.
Proof. See Admati (1985). QED
The vector z measures the total net demand due to traders’ private information and noise
traders’ supply shocks. Insofar as it conveys a signal about the “true” value of the asset payoﬀs,
it captures the “informational content” of the order ﬂows. The matrix Λ
¡1 maps equilibrium
prices into the traders’ total net demand: for a unitary price vector p0 = (1;1;:::;1), Λ
¡1
measures the size of the traders’ aggregate demand in each asset that is either due to private
information or to a liquidity shock.
According to (2.1) an informed agent’s demand function has two components. The ﬁrst
component (A(si ¡ p)) is proportional to the diﬀerence between the vector of private signals
and the vector of equilibrium prices. It reﬂects the agent’s “speculative” position based on his
private information. The second component ((Λ
¡1¡A)(¯ v¡p)) is proportional to the diﬀerence
between the vector of assets’ unconditional expectations and the vector of equilibrium prices.
This component reﬂects the investor’s position in (potentially) accommodating the total net
demand in each asset k.
A trader’s speculative aggressiveness is given by the conditional precision matrix of his
private signals weighted by his risk tolerance coeﬃcient: A = °Π². As Π² is positive deﬁnite
and ° > 0, the speculative component of a trader’s demand in an asset k is decreasing in its
own price for every asset k. His “market making” aggressiveness is captured by the diﬀerence
between traders’ total net demand and informed agents’ speculative aggressiveness in each
asset for a unitary price vector. This matrix has no particular structure and thus nothing
can be said a priori about the sign of its diagonal elements. Indeed, as p diﬀers from ¯ v
either because of noise traders’ liquidity shocks, or because of informed traders’ demands, an
informed agent attempts to establish whether the order he faces is due to the former or to the
latter. If (Λ
¡1)kk ¡ Akk > 0, then he attributes it to a supply shock and thus accommodates
5it. 4 This corresponds to the “normal goods” case of consumer theory in which the cheaper
is an asset, the more of it a trader wants to buy. If, however, (Λ
¡1)kk ¡ Akk · 0, then the
trader attributes the total net demand he faces to informed trading, refrains from taking the
other side of the trade, and a Giﬀen good may arise.
Notice that Giﬀen goods in the present context have a diﬀerent interpretation from the
one they have in consumer theory. Indeed, in the latter setting prices are exogenous to
traders’ demands, whereas in the former prices are endogenous equilibrium prices and demand
functions are equilibrium demands. Furthermore, a Giﬀen good in consumer theory is due
to the presence of a strong income eﬀect that oﬀsets the substitution eﬀect and leads to
an increase (decrease) in the trader’s demand when the good’s price increases (decreases).
However, in the current setting, owing to the assumed exponential utility function and the
presence of a riskless asset, income eﬀects do not exist. As the following examples show, an
asset here can be a Giﬀen good as a result of the information extraction problem that informed
traders face when forming the market making component of their demand functions.
Example 1 Suppose K = 2 and indicate with ¿xk and ½x, respectively the precision of the
random variable xk and the correlation coeﬃcient of the random variables x1;x2. Suppose












where ¸k = (1 + °ak¿uk)=(ak + °¿k), ak = Akk = °¿²k, and ¿k = ¿vk + a2
k¿uk indicate,
respectively, the reciprocal of market depth and the public precision associated with market
k = 1;2. Hence, traders’ strategies are given by
Xik(si;p) = ak(sik ¡ pk) +
°¿vk
1 + °¿ukak
(¯ vk ¡ pk):
As explained above, informed traders have two trading motives: they speculate on private
information, and they absorb the supply shock taking the counterpart of the aggregate order
in each asset and clearing markets (i.e. buying when the price declines and selling when it
increases w.r.t. its expected value). While speculation is due to private information, “mar-
ket making” is the result of the price discount (premium) informed traders receive on each
4To be sure: Λ
¡1 and A respectively measure the size of total traders’ demand and the speculative
component of each informed trader’s demand for a unitary price vector. Therefore if (Λ
¡1)kk ¡ Akk > 0,
(Λ
¡1)kk ¡ Akk captures the part of the total net demand for asset k that for a unitary price vector, in the
trader’s opinion, is not due to informed agents’ superior information about asset k.
6transaction because of risk aversion. To see this, rewrite prices and strategies as follows:
pk = E [vkjzk] ¡
¿vk
ak¿uk(ak + °¿k)
(¯ vk ¡ E [vkjzk]);
Xik(si;p) = ak(sik ¡ pk) +
°¿k¿vk
ak¿uk(ak + °¿k)
(¯ vk ¡ E [vkjzk]):
Whenever the traders in the market for asset k believe that on average asset k’s value is lower
than its unconditional expectation (i.e. ¯ vk > E[vkjzk]) an informed trader buys the asset at a
discount (i.e. pk ¡ E[vkjzk]) to be compensated for the risk that vk < E[vkjzk]. The opposite
happens when traders on average believe the asset value to be higher than its unconditional
expected value: in this case a trader sells the asset at a premium.
Clearly ak = °¿²k > 0 and (¿vk=(1 + °¿ukak)) > 0. Thus, no Giﬀen good appears in this
case.





























and traders’ strategies are given by:
Xi1(si;p) = si1 ¡ p1 + 15:6(¯ v1 ¡ p1) ¡ 3(¯ v2 ¡ p2);
Xi2(si;p) = si2 ¡ p2 ¡ 1:3(¯ v2 ¡ p2) + 7(¯ v1 ¡ p1): (2.2)
Notice that asset 2 is a Giﬀen good: an increase (decrease) in its price leads the trader to
increase (decrease) his position in the asset. Furthermore, notice that in (2.2) the Giﬀen
good “anomaly” is entirely due to the market making component of the trader’s demand.
In particular, whenever ¯ v2 > p2, traders are no longer willing to accommodate the supply
shock (as in example 1). Rather, for any given value of the speculative component of their
demand, in the presence of a price decrease they reduce their position in the asset. This is so
because of the information they extract from the observation of the aggregate orders in the two
assets. Indeed, suppose ¯ v1 > p1 and ¯ v2 > p2. Should traders attribute this price realization
to informed trading or to a supply shock? The positive correlation across pay-oﬀs makes a
contemporaneous value reduction in both assets likely. However, as the distribution of asset
1 is more concentrated than the one of asset 2, ¯ v1 > p1 is probably due to a selling pressure
from noise traders; on the contrary ¯ v2 > p2 may be the result of “bad news.” Such inference is
7reinforced by the higher dispersion of noise traders’ demand in asset 1 (w.r.t. asset 2) and by
the fact that noise traders’ demands are positively correlated. Hence, informed traders align
their behavior to the rest of the market in asset 2 and “lean against the wind” in asset 1.
Expressing the equilibrium price and a trader’s demand as done in example 1 sheds further
light on the market making component. Indeed, rearranging (2.1) gives:
p = E[vjz] ¡ (AΠu(A + °Π))
¡1 Πv(¯ v ¡ E[vjz]);
Xi(si;p) = A(si ¡ p) + °Π(AΠu(A + °Π))
¡1 Πv(¯ v ¡ E[vjz]):
Using the above parameter values:
p1 = E[v1jz] ¡ 9:7(¯ v1 ¡ E[v1jz]) + 1:85(¯ v2 ¡ E[v2jz]);
p2 = E[v2jz] ¡ 20:8(¯ v1 ¡ E[v1jz]) + 3:98(¯ v2 ¡ E[v2jz]);
and,
Xi1(si;p) = si1 ¡ p1 + 105:3(¯ v1 ¡ E[v1jz]) ¡ 20:14(¯ v2 ¡ E[v2jz]);
Xi2(si;p) = si2 ¡ p2 + 47:19(¯ v1 ¡ E[v1jz]) ¡ 9:02(¯ v2 ¡ E[v2jz]):
Notice that diﬀerently from example 1, a trader is not willing to accommodate the total net
demand in asset 2. Whenever the traders in the market for asset 2 believe that on average
asset 2’s value is lower than its unconditional expectation (¯ v2 > E[v2jz]), an informed trader
sells the asset at a premium (instead of buying it at a discount) to be compensated for the
risk that v2 > E[v2jz]. 5
Summarizing, when all traders in the market are risk averse, the demand of an informed agent
can be decomposed into a speculative and a market making component. Owing to correlation
eﬀects, the market making component may make informed agents willing to increase (decrease)
their position in a given asset when its price increases (decreases). Thus, intuitively, if an
informed agent were to ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to accommodate the total net demand, the market
making component should disappear rendering his demand well behaved in prices. 6 The next
section shows that this intuition is indeed correct.
5Strictly speaking, the trader decumulates his long position if si2¡p2 > 0 and accumulates it if the reverse
happens.
6It is important to emphasize, though, that such a decomposition is based on the trader’s private informa-
tion. As traders’ information is diverse, what a trader thinks of being a non-information-driven trade may be
perceived as information-driven by another trader (see He and Wang (1995) for a discussion of this issue in
the context of a one-asset, dynamic, noisy rational expectations equilibrium model).
83 The Market with Risk Neutral Market Makers
In this section I keep the same information structure of section 2 and introduce competitive
risk neutral market makers as in Vives (1995a) and Cespa (2001). Market makers can be seen
as uninformed agents that aggregate all traders’ orders and set a single market clearing price
vector. As a result of risk neutrality, prices do not incorporate a risk premium and informed
traders ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to accommodate traders’ total orders. Hence, they only trade
to speculate on private information and their demand functions are well behaved. However,
market makers, insofar as clear all trades, use the equilibrium price to disentangle noise
from information and correlation eﬀects can induce the Giﬀen phenomenon in their demand
functions.
More formally, let each informed trader i submit a vector of demand functions XIi(si;p),
indicating the position desired in each asset k at every price vector p, contingent on his
private information. Noise traders’ demand u is price inelastic and random. Risk neutral
market makers observe the aggregate order ﬂow L(¢) =
R 1
0 XIidi+u and set prices eﬃciently:
p = E[vjp]. 7 Restricting attention to linear equilibria, the following result holds:
Proposition 2 In the market with competitive, risk neutral market makers, there exists a
unique linear equilibrium where informed traders (I) and market makers (MM) trade accord-
ing to the following functions:







(¯ v ¡ p);
and prices are given by p = E[vjz] = ΛRNz + (I ¡ ΛRNA)¯ v, where A = °Π², z = Av + u,
ΛRN = Π
¡1AΠu, and Π = (Var[vjz])¡1 = Πv + AΠuA.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
Remark 1 Notice that as the matrix of traders’ speculative aggressiveness (A) coincides in
propositions 1 and 2, the informational content of the order ﬂows (z) does not change in the
two equilibria. As a consequence, the inference traders can make by observing equilibrium
prices in the two markets is the same.
7As will become clear in the proof of proposition 2, in equilibrium p is observationally equivalent to z.
Therefore, p = E[vjz] = E[vjp]. Eﬃcient pricing can be seen as the result of Bertrand competition among
risk neutral market makers for each asset order ﬂow (see Vives (1995b)).
9Informed traders’ behavior has now changed. Owing to market makers’ risk neutrality, the
risk premia incorporated into asset prices disappear and market making becomes unproﬁtable
to risk-averse, informed traders. Therefore, as A is positive deﬁnite, no Giﬀen good appears
in their demand functions. On the contrary, market makers’ demand may still display the
anomaly as the following example shows.














Hence, XIi;1(si;p) = si1 ¡ p1, XIi;2(si;p) = si2 ¡ p2, XMMj;1(p) = 115(¯ v1 ¡ p1) ¡ 22(¯ v2 ¡ p2),
and XMMj;2(p) = ¡13(¯ v2¡p2)+68(¯ v1¡p1). Asset 2 is the Giﬀen good and an intuition along
the lines given in example 2 applies here too.
Therefore, combining the intuition drawn from examples 2 and 3 with proposition 2 and
remark 1, Giﬀen goods cannot be the result of an information eﬀect that “overwhelms the
substitution eﬀect” as argued by Admati (1985). If such an information eﬀect was at the root
of the anomaly, it should have also aﬀected the strategy of an informed trader displayed in
proposition 2.
The Giﬀen goods anomaly comes from the role that prices perform in informed traders’
strategies. With no risk neutral market makers, prices have two roles: (1) they allow to
disentangle error terms from information in their private signals; (2) they allow to separate
noise from information in the observed order ﬂow realizations. The ﬁrst role is related to
the speculative component of the trader’s demand; the second role is related to the market

















kl (¯ v ¡ p)kl:
To see how prices perform the ﬁrst role, assume that ½² > 0 and that trader i receives two
signals sik, sih such that sik > pk and sih > ph. This can happen for two reasons: either both
assets are worth more than what the market thinks (i.e. asset prices are biased downward
e.g. by noise traders’ selling pressure), or both signals are biased upward. The existence of
positive correlation across signal-error terms strengthens the hypothesis of a contemporaneous,
upward bias into the trader’s signals. 8 Given this, he reinforces his belief that the good news
he received is due to the eﬀect of error biases and reduces his demand for both assets.
8This is the case because an error that biases upward the information contained in sik is more likely to
happen together with an error biasing upwards the information about asset h as well.
10As far as the second role, example 2 provided an intuition for it. As soon as risk neutral
market makers are introduced in the model, informed traders no longer ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
absorb the liquidity shock and prices cease to perform the second role for them. However, since
market makers take the counterpart of the aggregate order in each asset and clear markets,
such a second role is relevant to their objectives. Hence, the Giﬀen goods anomaly only
characterizes risk neutral market makers’ demand functions.
The above conclusion also clariﬁes the eﬀect of assuming inﬁnitely dispersed noise traders’
demands (see Admati (1985), p. 647). In this situation, informed traders refrain from using
prices to disentangle noise from information in the observed order ﬂows. Formally, letting
Πu ! 0 in the equilibrium of proposition 1 (in any norm on matrices) gives:
Corollary 1 In the market with no risk neutral market makers, when noise traders’ demand
dispersion increases without bound: Λ ! Λ
¤ = (°Πv + A)¡1, E[vjz] ! ¯ v, and
p ! p
¤ = Λ





¤) = A(si ¡ p
¤) + °Πv(¯ v ¡ p
¤);
almost surely.
As Πv is positive deﬁnite and ° > 0, the market making component of an informed trader’s
demand is well behaved and Giﬀen goods disappear. Indeed, as noise traders’ demand dis-
persion increases without bound, informed traders cannot use prices to disentangle noise from
information in the observed order ﬂows realization. Furthermore, the risk of trading with an
informed agent vanishes and risk averse traders are always willing to accommodate the total
net demand they face at a premium. To see this, express the equilibrium price as follows:
p
¤ = ¯ v + (°Πv + A)
¡1(z ¡ E[z]):
Notice that (°Πv +A)¡1 is a symmetric, positive deﬁnite matrix. Hence, whenever the total
net demand in an asset k is higher than expected (zk > E[zk]), an informed trader attributes
the demand realization to noise traders’ liquidity needs. As a consequence, he accommodates
it selling the asset at a premium which is proportional to the demand “surprise.” Thus, prices
aggregate information (i.e. reﬂect the value of z) allowing informed traders to use them to
disentangle the error terms aﬀecting their signals. Therefore, in this Walrasian equilibrium,
prices perform the ﬁrst role but not the second role. 9
9It is interesting to contrast this equilibrium with its counterpart in the market with risk neutral market
makers. As shown in proposition 2, the equilibrium price there is given by p = E[vjz]. However, as noise
11Remark 2 The result that the Giﬀen goods anomaly only characterizes market makers’ de-
mand functions is likely to depend on the competitive assumption about informed traders’
conduct, and on their risk-averse preferences. Indeed, a “strategic” insider can exploit such
anomalous market-making behavior and induce a price increase to speculate on it. The latter
eﬀect is stronger, the less risk-averse the insider is, as a very risk-tolerant insider does not suf-
fer from the unpredictability of the asset pay-oﬀs, and thus exploits his information advantage
more aggressively. This intuition leads to conjecture that in the presence of a risk-neutral,
non atomistic trader, the Giﬀen goods anomaly should disappear also from market makers’
strategies. Indeed, Caball´ e and Krishnan (1992) in a multi-asset generalization of Kyle (1985),
ﬁnd that in equilibrium the matrix mapping order ﬂows into prices must be symmetric and
positive deﬁnite, ruling out the existence of Giﬀen goods. 10
4 Model’s Generalizations
In this section I consider two generalizations of the model studied in section 2: ﬁrst, I add
a sector of risk-averse uninformed traders to the market considered in section 2. Next, I
relax the simplifying assumptions introduced in section 2. The former generalization allows
to obtain a model where the equilibrium of proposition 2 arises as a limit result when the
risk-bearing capacity of uninformed traders grows without bound. The latter enables to show
that the intuitions so far obtained, apply to Admati’s equilibrium as well.
4.1 The Market with Uninformed Traders
Formally, assume that a continuum of uninformed traders distributed in the interval [0;1] is
added to the market of section 2. Every uninformed trader j’s preferences are represented by a
CARA utility U(¼Uj) = ¡expf¡¼Uj=°Ug where °U > 0 is the coeﬃcient of constant absolute
risk tolerance and ¼Uj = x0
Uj(v ¡ p) is the proﬁt of buying x0
Uj = (xUj;1;xUj;2;:::;xUj;K)
units of each asset at price p. Assume that every uninformed trader submits a vector of
traders’ demand is inﬁnitely dispersed, market makers cannot extract any information from z to estimate
v. As a consequence, p = ¯ v, informed traders cannot use the information conveyed by z to disentangle the
error terms in their private signals and X
¤
Ii = A(si ¡ ¯ v). Thus, diﬀerently from the case analyzed above,
the presence of competitive, risk neutral market makers prevents the equilibrium price from aggregating any
information about the asset payoﬀs.
10Being a generalization of Kyle (1985), the insider in Caball´ e and Krishnan’s model submits non price-
contingent orders to competitive, risk-neutral market makers, diﬀerently from the informed traders of the
present context. It is important to emphasize that strategic behavior per se does not prevent Giﬀen goods
from arising in equilibrium. As Bhattacharya, Reny, and Spiegel (1995) show, in a multi-asset model where
a risk-averse insider has both a “hedging” and an “informational” trading motive, the uninformed agents’
demand function can still display the Giﬀen anomaly.
12demand functions XUj(p) indicating the desired position in each asset k at every price vector
p. Normalize his initial wealth to zero and indicate with °I the risk tolerance coeﬃcient of an
informed trader. Restricting attention to linear equilibria, the following result applies:
Proposition 3 In the market with a sector of (CARA) uninformed traders (U), there exists
a unique linear equilibrium where agents trade according to the functions













(¯ v ¡ p);
and prices are given by p = ΛUz + (I ¡ ΛUA)¯ v, where A = °IΠ², z = Av + u, ΛU =
(A + °Π)¡1(I + °AΠu), Π = (Var[vjz])¡1 = Πv + AΠuA, and ° = °I + °U.
Proof. See the appendix. QED
Notice that informed traders speculate on private information (as in proposition 1) and,
together with uninformed traders, accommodate the total net demand. As in proposition 1,
the Giﬀen goods anomaly (potentially) comes from the market making component of a trader’s
demand.
Corollary 2 If °U ! 1 the equilibrium of proposition 3 converges (almost surely) to the
one of proposition 2.
Proof. It follows immediately from the fact that A does not depend on °U and as °U ! 1,
ΛU ! ΛRN. Thus, p converges (almost surely) to E[vjz]. QED
Therefore, as the aggregate risk-bearing capacity of uninformed traders increases, the
risk premia incorporated into equilibrium prices disappear, informed traders ﬁnd no longer
proﬁtable to accommodate the total net demand and their demand function becomes “well
behaved” in prices.
4.2 The Model with Non-Identically Distributed Signals
One may wonder about what is the eﬀect of the simplifying assumptions on the information
structure made in section 2. In particular, is the demand decomposition obtained in propo-
sition 1 due to the fact that traders’ signals are i.i.d.? If this was the case, then the Giﬀen
goods anomaly may not only be due to the market making component of traders’ demand
and the analysis of the previous sections would only apply to a particular category of noisy
rational expectations linear equilibria with multiple assets. However, it turns out that the
13results are general and that one can apply the same decomposition also to the market studied
by Admati (1985).
In particular, let us modify the informational assumptions of section 2.1 in the following
two aspects:
A1. Traders’ private information, risk tolerance and initial wealth. Traders receive a vector
of private signals of a potentially diﬀerent conditional precision: si = v + ²i is such
that ²i » N(0;Π
¡1
²i ), ²i and ²j are independent for i 6= j, Π
¡1
²i is positive deﬁnite for




²j for i 6= j; risk tolerance coeﬃcients are diﬀerent across traders:
°i 6= °j for i 6= j; ﬁnally, a trader i’s initial wealth is W0i > 0.
A2. Noise traders’ demand and the risk free asset return. Noise traders’ expected demand
is non null: u » N(¯ u;Π
¡1
u ); and the return on the risk free asset is given by R ¸ 1.
With the above assumptions the model outlined in section 2 coincides with the one studied
by Admati (1985). Therefore, the following result holds:
Proposition 4 In the market outlined in section 2 enriched with the assumptions A1 and A2,
there exists a unique linear equilibrium where informed agents trade according to the function
Xi(si;p) = (4.3)
Ai(si ¡ Rp) + (°i=¯ °)
³
¯ Λ
¡1 ¡ ¯ A
´
(¯ v ¡ Rp) + (°i=¯ °)
¡
I + ¯ ° ¯ AΠu
¢¡1 ¯ AΠu¯ u;
and the vector of equilibrium prices is given by
p = (1=R)¯ Λz + (1=R)(I ¡ ¯ Λ¯ A)¯ v + (¯ °=R)(¯ °(Πv + ¯ AΠu ¯ A) + ¯ A)
¡1 ¯ AΠu¯ u;
where Ai = °iΠ²i, ¯ ° =
R 1
0 °idi, ¯ A =
R 1
0 °iΠ²idi, z = ¯ Av + u, and ¯ Λ = (¯ °(Πv + ¯ AΠu ¯ A) +
¯ A)¡1 (I + ¯ ° ¯ AΠu).
Proof. See Admati (1985). QED
As one can verify according to (4.3), a trader’s strategy has both a “speculative” and a
“market making” component as (2.1). As Ai = °iΠ²i, °i > 0 and Π²i is positive deﬁnite
for all i, Giﬀen goods can only be due to the “market making” component. Notice also
that as E[u] = ¯ u, informed speculators expect to accommodate a constant supply shock ¯ u.
Thus, owing to the presence of a non-null expected noise traders’ demand, the market making
component in this equilibrium reﬂects both realized and expected factors.
If °i = ° and Π²i = Π² for all i, ¯ u = 0 and R = 1, traders’ speculative aggressiveness
coincides for all agents and is given by A = °Π², the “expected” market making component
in (4.3) vanishes and the equilibrium of proposition 4 coincides with the one of proposition 1.
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Recent work in ﬁnance theory has highlighted the role played by Giﬀen goods in aﬀecting stock
market behavior around “unusual” events. Giﬀen goods characterize both unstable equilibria
and episodes of market crashes. Indeed, when faced with the problem of extracting a signal
about the asset fundamentals from the observed aggregate orders, traders with a “backward
bending” demand curve shy away from assets whose price plummets and increase their position
in assets whose price rockets. Depending on the speciﬁc model, this either destabilizes the
market (as in Cespa (2002)) or introduces discontinuities in the function mapping the asset
supply into its equilibrium price (as in Gennotte and Leland (1990) and Barlevy and Veronesi
(2002)). These contributions testify the importance of understanding the conditions under
which Giﬀen goods arise in markets with asymmetric information.
Building on the result of Admati (1985), in this paper I have shown that contrary to
previous intuitions in a market where informed and noise traders exchange vectors of assets,
information eﬀects per se are not responsible for the existence of Giﬀen goods. The role that
prices play in informed traders’ strategies also matters. In particular, I have demonstrated
that whenever all agents in a market are risk averse, an informed trader has two trading
motives: speculation and market making. Insofar as the trader uses equilibrium prices to
separate informed from noise traders’ orders, the presence of correlation eﬀects can lead him
to attribute the total net demand he faces to informed trading. As a consequence, he may
thus refrain from taking the other side of the trade, giving rise to the Giﬀen goods anomaly. I
have then given suﬃcient conditions that allow to remove the anomaly from informed traders
demands.
While the demand decomposition result is robust to general model speciﬁcations, 11 the
analysis clearly relies on the assumptions about informed traders’ behavior and preferences.
Indeed, as conjectured in the paper, the presence of a risk-neutral, non-atomistic trader should
rule out the Giﬀen phenomenon from all traders’ strategies. In particular, it would be inter-
esting to study a model where risk-averse, imperfectly competitive insiders submit multidi-
mensional demand functions to risk neutral market makers. In this setup, one could analyze
the behavior of the equilibrium price mapping as the insiders’ risk-tolerance increases and the
number of insiders grows large.
11Within the realm of the CARA-multivariate-Normal model with independent private signals.
15Appendix
The following lemma, which is useful to compute conditional expected values, adapts a stan-
dard result from normal theory to the present context (see e.g. DeGroot (1969), Theorem 1,
section 9.9).
Lemma 1 Suppose that X1;X2;:::;Xn is a random sample from a multivariate normal distri-
bution with unknown mean vector M and speciﬁed precision matrices Σi, i = 1;2;:::;n. Sup-
pose also that the prior distribution of M is multivariate normal with mean vector ¹o and pre-
cision matrix Σo such that ¹o 2 IR
K and Σo is a symmetric positive deﬁnite matrix. Then the
posterior distribution of M when Xi = xi (i = 1;2;:::;n) is a multivariate normal with mean
vector ¹1 and precision matrix Σ1 = Σo +
Pn
i=1 Σi, where ¹1 = Σ
¡1
1 (Σo¹o + (
Pn
i=1 Σi) e x)





Proof. For M = m and Xi = xi (i = 1;2;:::;n), the likelihood function fn(x1;x2;:::;xnjm)





















(m ¡ e x) +
n X
i=1
(xi ¡ e x)
0Σi(xi ¡ e x):











(m ¡ e x)
)
: (5.5)
The prior p.d.f. of M satisﬁes
'(m) / expf¡(1=2)(m ¡ ¹o)
0Σo(m ¡ ¹o)g; (5.6)
and the posterior p.d.f. g(¢jx1;x2;:::;xn) of M will be proportional to the product of the
functions speciﬁed by (5.5) and (5.6). However, one can verify that
(m ¡ ¹o)







(m ¡ e x) = (m ¡ ¹1)
0Σ1(m ¡ ¹1)
+ terms not involving m:
16Hence, we can write
g(mjx1;x2;:::;xn) / expf¡(1=2)(m ¡ ¹1)
0Σ1(m ¡ ¹1)g: (5.7)
The p.d.f. speciﬁed by (5.7) is that of a multivariate normal distribution for which the mean
vector and the precision matrix are as speciﬁed in the statement of the lemma. QED
Proof of proposition 2
When submitting his demand, a trader i has available the vector of signals si. In any
linear equilibrium, due to the strong law of large numbers, private and public information
are conditionally independent. Therefore, the trader’s strategy depends both on si, and on
the equilibrium price vector p. Assume the agent submits a vector of demand schedules
XIi(si;p); indicating the position desired in each asset k at every price vector p, contingent
on the available information, and restrict attention to linear equilibria. Market makers thus
observe the vector of aggregate order ﬂows L(¢) =
R 1
0 XIidi + u.
Consider a candidate symmetric, linear equilibrium XIi(si;p) = Asi + Á(p), where A
and Á(¢) are respectively the matrix of trading intensities and a linear function of current
prices. Also, assume for the time being that the matrix A is nonsingular (in equilibrium this
assumption turns out to be correct). Owing to linear strategies, the aggregate order ﬂow
is then: L(¢) = z + Á(p), where z = Av + u, is the vector of order ﬂows’ informational
contents. Because of competition for each order ﬂow and risk neutrality, market makers
set the equilibrium price equal to the conditional expectation of the pay-oﬀ vector given






hence we can apply lemma 1 with n = 1, m = v and x1 = A
¡1z to obtain: p = E[vjz]
= Π
¡1(Πv¯ v + A
0Πuz) = ΛRNz + (I ¡ ΛRNA)¯ v, where Π = (Var[vjz])¡1 = Πv + A
0ΠuA
and ΛRN = Π
¡1A
0Πu.
Given the formula for the market price I can now solve for the the demand function of
a generic trader i. Since in equilibrium the parameters of the price are known, the trader
conditions his estimation of the pay-oﬀ vector on p and si. The assumption of a CARA
utility function and multivariate normality gives:
XIi(si;p) = °(Var[vjsi;z])
¡1(E[vjsi;z] ¡ p): (5.8)
Notice again that sijv » N(v;Π
¡1
² ) and that p in equilibrium is observationally equivalent
to A
¡1z which we know satisﬁes A




0)¡1). Applying again lemma 1
with n = 2, x1 = si, x2 = A
¡1z and m = v gives E[vjsi;z] = Π
¡1
i (Πp+Π²si), where Πi =
17(Var[vjsi;z])¡1 = Πv + A
0ΠuA + Π². Plugging these expressions in (5.8) and simplifying,
XIi = °Π²(si ¡ p). Identifying the demand components: A = °Π² and Á(p) = Ap. Notice
that A = A
0 = °Π², hence the assumption that A is nonsingular is correct in equilibrium.
To determine a market maker’s demand, consider the equilibrium condition
Z 1
0
XIidi + u +
Z 1
0
XMMjdj = z ¡ Ap + XMMj = 0:
Solving for z from the equilibrium price, substituting it in the above equation and isolating
XMMj(p) gives: XMMj(p) = (Λ
¡1
RN ¡ A)(¯ v ¡ p).
QED
Proof of proposition 3
Along the same lines of the previous proof, owing to CARA utility functions and multi-
variate normality
XIi(si;p) = °I (Var[vjsi;z])
¡1 (E [vjsi;z] ¡ p) (5.9)
= °IΠ²(si ¡ p) + °IΠ(E [vjz] ¡ p);
and
XUj(p) = °U (Var[vjz])
¡1 (E [vjz] ¡ p) (5.10)
= °UΠ(E [vjz] ¡ p):
Imposing market clearing, p = ΛUz +(I ¡ΛUA)¯ v, where A = °IΠ², ΛU = (A+°Π)¡1(I +
°AΠu) and ° = °I + °U. Solving for z in the equilibrium price gives z = Λ
¡1
U p ¡ (I +
°AΠu)¡1°Πv¯ v, and substituting it in (5.9) and (5.10) gives the demand functions for in-
formed and uninformed traders displayed in proposition 3. QED
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